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In the Best Interest: The Adoption 
of F.H., an Indian Child 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The competing interests of biological parents, adoptive 
parents, extended family, child welfare agencies, and the chil-
dren themselves make adoption difficult under any circum-
stances. Even when all parties enter into the adoption intend-
ing to provide a secure home for the child there may be genu-
line, conflicting values and disagreement as to what will serve 
the child's best interest. 1 The definition of "best interest" has 
become a battleground for child-welfare experts, with different 
factions giving priority to emotional security, medical needs, 
educational resources, economic stability, ethnic background, or 
other factors. 
When the adoption involves an Indian child and non-Indi-
an adoptive parents, cultural factors and statutory restrictions 
complicate an already complex and emotional process. Indian 
tribes have long mourned the loss of their most precious asset, 
their children, to non-Indian adoptive parents.2 When an Indi-
an child is removed from his or her tribal roots and transplant-
ed into society outside the native culture, both the tribe and 
the child sustain a loss. 3 There is no easy remedy for such loss, 
though many concerned and dedicated people have struggled 
with the problem.4 This note examines the issues surrounding 
adoption of Indian children by non-Indian parents through the 
case of F.H.,5 an Alaskan native child from the Village of 
Noatak, Alaska, and the application of the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act6 ( ICWA) to such cases. 
Section II describes the factual and procedural background 
of the case. Section III discusses the provisions and the legisla-
tive history of the ICW A. Section IV analyzes the application of 
1 See. e.g., Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 27 GoNZ. L. REV. 3fl:1 (1992). 
2 ld. at ;iM. 
3 Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests 
Standard, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (19R4). 
4 ld. 
fi In re Adoption of F.H., 8fi1 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993). 
6 25 U.S.C. § 19m (1988). 
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the ICWA to the present case. The note concludes that a child's 
well-being must weigh heavily in the balance against the inter-
ests of other parties. 
II. FACT SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Background 
F.H. is a female child born February 24, 1990, to a native 
Alaskan mother. 7 The identity of her biological father is not 
known.8 Her mother, identified only as E.P.D., is a member of 
the Alaskan village of Noatak, though she has not resided in 
the village for several years and has no plans to retum. During 
her pregnancy, E.P.D. was homeless and suffering from severe 
alcohol dependence. 9 E.P.D. is orphaned, with no close ties to 
her native village. Her mother was murdered by a brother. Her 
father died of alcoholism. None of E.P.D.'s siblings grew up in 
Noatak, though she does have a cousin, Mary Penn, who lives 
there. 
At the time of her baby's birth, E.P.D. had a blood alcohol 
level of .275. 10 Due to E.P.D.'s homeless status, the history of 
alcohol abuse, and the high blood alcohol level at birth, F.H. 
was taken into custody by the state welfare organization, the 
Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS), shortly after 
birth. Due to prenatal alcohol abuse by the mother, the child 
was at risk for Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE), though not full-
blown Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) which is similar though 
more severe. 11 
F.H. was subsequently placed in a series of four foster 
homes. The third set of foster parents, the Hartleys, cared for 
F.H. from June 1990, when she was approximately four months 
7 Adoption of F.H., ilfi1 P.2d at l:i62. 
8 ld. 
9 ld. 
10 A person with a blood alcohol level of .01 is legally drunk in most states. 
At the level of .(ll, one in every thousand parts of blood is pure alcohol. A concen-
tration of .4 can produce a coma. RICIIARIJ J. WA<;MAN, MEDICAL AND HEALTH 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 499-FiOU (198::l). 
11 Adoption of F.H., 8Fi1 P.2d at 1::lfi2. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) results 
from maternal prenatal consumption of alcohol. The effects on the child include 
facial malformations, mental retardation, behavior problems, and learning disorders. 
The full syndrome affects one in every 700 live births in this country. In some 
Indian communities, the incidence is as high as one in eight births. Fetal Alcohol 
Effects (FAE) is a milder form of the syndrome. Ann P. Stressguth et al., Fetal 
Alcohol SyndromP in AdolPscents and Adults, 26fi JAMA 1961, 1961 (1991). 
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old, until June 1991 when the foster father, Carol Hartley was 
transferred from Alaska to Kennewick, Washington. F.H., then 
sixteen months old, was placed with a fourth foster family. In 
March of 1992, at age two years, F.H. was adopted by the 
Hartleys and now lives with them in Washington. Child wel-
fare officials in Washington have indicated that F.H. is happy, 
well-adjusted, and seems to be making good progress. She may 
continue to have medical problems resulting from prenatal 
alcohol exposure. 12 
During the time F.H. was in foster care, her biological 
mother discussed giving up custody to several people, including 
her cousin and the Hartleys. 13 Notably, F.H. never lived with 
her biological mother or any member of her extended family, 
nor has she ever been to Noatak. 14 
The adoption was an open placement allowing the child 
access to her biological family and her native heritage. 15 
E.P.D. believed that she could visit the child more easily in 
Kennewick than Noatak. The birth mother and the extended 
biological family were given visitation rights and F.H. retained 
inheritance rights from E.P.D. 16 
B. Procedural Background 
1. The adoption 
When DFYS took custody of F.H., the agency filed a Child 
in Need of Aid (CINA) petition, and notified the village in com-
pliance with provisions of the ICWA.' 7 A petition to terminate 
E.P.D.'s parental rights was filed in August 1991, with trial set 
for September 18, 1991. On September 16, two days prior to 
the trial date, E.P.D. executed documents voluntarily relin-
quishing parental rights to the Hartleys. 18 E.P.D. stipulated 
three conditions: (1) the Hartleys proceed with adoption of 
12 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1362. 
13 !d. 
14 !d. 
15 Open adoption, as used by this court, permits visitation by the biological 
parents, and family records of both adoptive and biological families are available to 
the child. !d. at 1~{63. 
16 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1:163. 
17 The ICWA requires notice to the tribe, or in this case, the native village, 
that adoption or eustody proeeedings are pending whenever the state has reason to 
believe the child involved is or may be an Indian child. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988). 
See also In re J.W., 498 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa Ct. App. 1973). 
18 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1:{6:{-65. 
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F.H.; (2) F.H. retain inheritance rights from E.P.D.; and (3) 
E.P.D. and her extended family retain visitation rights with 
F.H. 
The Hartleys filed a Petition for Adoption the following 
day. The adoption was approved on March 5, 1992, despite 
vigorous opposition by the village. 19 The judge approved the 
adoption based on the following factors: (1) the preference of 
the birth mother; (2) the open status of the Hartley adoptive 
placement; and (3) the continued inheritance and visitation 
rights of the birth family, giving F.H. access to her native heri-
tage.20 Social service officials made numerous contacts with 
the Hartley family during the first year of the adoption, and 
agency reports were very positive about the placement.21 
2. The appeal 
On appeal by the village, the Court stated that the issue 
was "whether the superior court erred in concluding that good 
cause existed to deviate from the adoptive placement preferenc-
es22 mandated under the ICWA."23 The Hartleys had to 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that there was good 
cause for permitting a placement other than those preferred 
under the ICW A The court had discretion to determine if good 
cause existed, based on the facts of the individual case.24 
What constitutes good cause will vary, based on the facts of the 
case, and may include "the best interests of the child, the wish-
es of the biological parents, the suitability of persons preferred 
for placement and the child's ties to the tribe."25 
The Supreme Court of Alaska found no abuse of discretion 
19 In October 1991, after receiving notice of the Petition for Adoption, the 
village moved to intervene in the proceeding, based on the right of intervention 
under the ICWA. !d. The ICWA gives tribes a right of intervention anytime during 
a custody proceeding involving an Indian child. 2fi U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988). The 
Hartleys argued that intervention was barred by laches. It was held to be "doubt-
ful" that laches could be raised in such a case, in view of the tribe's right to inter-
vene at any time. 
20 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363-65. 
21 An early interventionist who worked with F.H. in the Hartley's home 
twice a month for almost one year believes F.H. made substantial progress during 
that period and that F.H.'s bond with Nancy Hartley is the best F.H. will ever 
have. Both guardians ad litem assigned to F.H. testified that they believe it is in 
F.H.'s best interest to be placed with the Hartleys. !d. at 1364-65. 
22 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). 
23 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1364-65. 
24 !d. 
2fi !d. 
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by the lower court,26 and approved this adoption by non-Indi-
an adoptive parents even though the native village opposed the 
placement, intervened in the action, and offered an alternative 
placement with an extended family member, Mary Penn, who 
qualified as a first priority placement preference under the 
statutory directives of the ICW A. 27 The basis for the decision 
lies in the state court interpretation of the available exemp-
tions from the ICWA placement preferences. To understand 
these exemptions, it is necessary to look at the history and 
provisions of the Act. 
Ill. THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
A. Legislative History and Intent 
The ICWA is the product of long-standing dissatisfaction 
and frustration with adoption and custody procedures common-
ly used to separate Indian children from their native families 
and culture. Though these procedures were not specifically 
intended to cause separation and cultural deprivation to the 
child or the tribe, the effect on native American tribes was 
devastating.28 During legislative hearings on the ICWA, it 
was estimated that between one-fourth and one-third of all 
Indian children had been removed from their Indian homes by 
various public and private organizations, and placed in non-
Indian homes or in other non-Indian custodial arrangements, 
such as boarding schools. 29 Congress sought to reverse this 
trend by enacting the ICW A, which states in its opening pas-
sages, "there is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children."30 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Linda A. Marousek, Note, The Indian Child WP!farf' Act of 1978: Provi-
sions and Policy, 25 S.D. L. REV. 98 (1980). 
29 In Minnesota, for example, during 1971-1972, nearly one-fourth of all In-
dian infants born in the state were placed for adoption, with 90% of those infants 
placed in non-Indian homes. Hearings on 8. 1214 Before Senate Select Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 538-40 (1977). Indian children overall were 
eight times more likely than non-Indian children to be in adoptive homes. Id. 
30 Among other things Congress found: 
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued exis-
tence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the Unit-
ed States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children 
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe; 
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken 
up hy the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by 
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The statute recognizes inherent differences in child care 
practices between Indian and non-Indian cultures, previously 
not given positive consideration. These basic differences are 
more than merely alternative means to the same end. Tribal 
childrearing practices result from a fundamentally different 
world view. This cultural conflict is poignantly obvious in the 
following statement of Indian leaders in 17 44. Virginia colo-
nists invited Iroquois boys to leave the tribal community and 
attend the College of William and Mary. The Iroquois leaders 
declined the invitation. 
We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning 
taught in those Colleges, and the Maintenance of our young 
men, while with you, would be very expensive for you. We are 
convinced, that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and 
we thank you heartily. But you, who are wise must know that 
different Nations have different Conceptions of things and 
you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind 
of Education happen not to be the same as yours. We have 
had some Experience of it. Several of our Young People were 
formerly brought up at the Colleges of the Northern Provinc-
es; they were instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they 
came back to us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every 
means ofliving in the woods ... neither fit for Hunters, War-
riors, nor Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We 
are, however, not the less oblig'd by your kind Offer, tho' we 
decline accepting it; and to show our grateful Sense of it, if 
the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons, 
we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we 
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive 
homes and institutions; and 
(5) that the United States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over 
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bod-
ies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian 
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian commu-
nities and families. 
§ 1902. Congressional declaration of policy 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability 
and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of mini-
mum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their 
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes 
which will reflect the unique values of Indian (:ulture, and by providing 
for assistance to tribes in the operation of child and family service pro-
grams. 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902 (1988). 
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know, and make Men ofthem.31 
Mter 250 years, one can sense the consternation of the 
Gentlemen of Virginia at the refusal of their offer, teamed with 
a pointed rebuke of the cultural arrogance that assumed Indian 
youths would be better off cared for and educated by non-Indi-
ans. Implicit in the offer is an ignorance of the gap in educa-
tional priorities between the two cultures. 
Generations later, these assumptions continue to cause 
pain and misunderstanding between the cultures, evidenced in 
the following statement of Mr. Calvin Isaac, a modern tribal 
leader: 
One of the most serious failings of the present systems is that 
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural 
parents by nontribal governmental authorities who have no 
basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social pre-
mises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of 
the individuals who decide the fate of our children are at best 
ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst contemptful of 
the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a non-
Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian 
child. 32 
Misunderstanding arises from the conception of extended 
family and the determination of who constitutes an appropriate 
caregiver in tribal culture.33 Most Indians who maintain tradi-
tional ways consider the entire tribe to be quasi-family, and 
have close relationships with numerous relatives by blood and 
marriage. The misinterpretation of these relationships has 
been a source of mutual frustration to social workers and Indi-
ans. An Indian parent under stress may leave children in the 
care of extended family members, without intending a perma-
nent placement.34 Social workers have occasionally interpreted 
81 Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the 
Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian 
Children, 7 AM. INDIAN 1. REV. 51 (1979). 
82 (Emphasis added.) Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 
:w (19R9), citing the testimony of Chief Isaac at the congressional hearing passage 
of the ICWA; see also Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcommittee on Indian Af-
fairs and Public Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1978). 
88 See, e.g., Graybeal v. Alaska, 912 F.2d 468 (Alaska 1990). An informal 
custodial placement arranged according to traditional Athabascan tribal practices 
was sufficient to satisfy the ICWA definition of Indian custodian, even though the 
child's natural mother opposed continuing the placement. 
84 Occasionally, the child may be left with non-Indian friends. In a pre-
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this temporary arrangement as abandonment and initiated 
proceedings to remove the child from the home and terminate 
parental rights, much to the astonishment and indignation of 
the Indian caregiver.35 
Not all child removal cases result from such benign circum-
stances, and not all Indian children placed with other Indian or 
non-Indian families end up in happy, loving homes. Alcoholism 
and drug dependency remain serious problems on and off reser-
vations.36 Genuine neglect and physical abuse disrupt Indian 
families just as they do other families. These social ills are 
exacerbated in Indian communities by a dearth of employment 
opportunities, poverty, inadequate medical facilities, and limit-
ed access to education.37 Nevertheless, in the ICWA, Congress 
has attempted to preserve for Indian children the right to re-
main in their native culture even when foster care or adoptive 
placement is required.38 
ICWA case, a Crow mother allowed non-Indian friends, the Wakefields, to take her 
child, in the belief they would care for him while she was unable to do so. The 
mother refused requests for adoption. When she later wanted the child returned, 
the Wakefields, who had intended to keep the child permanently, were distressed 
and sought assistance from Maryland courts, which declined subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The tribal court returned the child to its mother. This appears to be an ex-
ample of misunderstanding between Indian and non-Indian about the nature of the 
temporary custody relationship. See Wakefield v. Little Light, :347 A.2d 228 (Md. 
1975). 
!d. 
:3fi Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. :30, :35 n.4 (1989). 
One of the particular points of concern was the failure of the non-Indian 
child welfare workers to understand the role of the extended family in 
Indian society. The House Report on the ICWA noted, 'An Indian child 
may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are 
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, 
untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be so-
cially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the 
nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental 
rights ... .' 
:36 See In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 4::!7 (Minn. 1990); In re Riva M., 
235 Cal. App. :-ld 403 (Cal. 1991). 
:37 See Village of Chalkystik v. M.S.F., 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984); In re 
Wanomi, 216 Cal. App. 3d 156 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Appeal in Coconino Co. Juve-
nile Action No. J10175, 736 P.2d 829 (Ariz. 1987); K.N. v. Alaska, 856 P.2d 468 
(Alaska 199:i). 
:38 A related situation concerns Indian children who do not have intact Indi-
an families and little or no contact with their native culture. A good example is 
that of illegitimate children who are born off the reservation to non-Indian moth-
ers. It has been suggested that such children do not fall within the intent of the 
ICWA. See. e.fii., In re Adoption of Infant Boy Crews, 80::! P.2d 24 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1991); see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 831 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1992); In re 
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B. Provisions of the Act 
The Indian Child Welfare Act does not bind tribal courts. 
It applies only to state court custody proceedings,39 and is de-
signed to prevent placement of Indian children with non-Indian 
adoptive or foster parents. Ostensibly, these provisions provide 
for the child's best interest, though the ICWA may define these 
interests differently for Indian adoptions than state courts' 
definition of best interest for adoption procedures of non-Indian 
children. 40 
1. Defining ((Indian child" under the ICWA 
Defining "Indian child" for the purposes of the ICW A is 
crucial to understanding the statuteY The designation "Indi-
an" is a term of art in Indian law, and carries different mean-
ings for the purposes of different statutes. "Indian" may refer to 
any person with native American ancestry, though the "quan-
tum of Indian blood" necessary for definition as an "Indian" 
varies from tribe to tribe and according to the statute. The 
term may refer to someone who functions as a member of a 
specific Indian tribe. Though there is no definitive inclusive 
definition, to be considered "Indian" a person must generally 
have at least one ancestor who lived on this continent before 
the coming of Europeans, and must be recognized as an Indian 
by other Indians in his or her community.42 However, ancestry 
and cultural recognition are not enough to grant membership 
in any tribe, absent tribal consent.43 Individual tribes deter-
mine enrollment requirements, which is significant in estab-
lishing eligibility for many federal programs. In 1934, the Indi-
an Reorganization Act (IRA) defined "Indian" for most federal 
programs as any person who is a member of any recognized 
tribe. 44 
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
~{9 See Dale, supra note 1, at 353. 
40 See Howard, supra note 3, at 503. 
41 The party seeking to invoke the ICWA has the burden of proof that the 
child in question is an Indian child within the definition of the ICWA. In re 
J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1990). 
42 ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 83-85 (1991). 
43 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 536 U.S. 49, 55 (1978). The Supreme 
Court upheld the right of the Pueblo to deny tribal membership to children of 
female members who marry outside the tribe, while admitting similarly situated 
children of men of that tribe. 
44 The IRA uses the following definition: 
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The definitions of "Indian child" and "Indian tribe"45 in 
the ICWA are very similar to IRA provisions and adopt most of 
the factors previously recognized as conferring "Indian" status, 
while adding several unique concepts.46 For the purposes of 
the ICWA, an Indian child is (a) a member of an Indian tribe 
or (b) a person who is eligible for membership in an Indian 
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe ... Y 
When any state court knows or has reason to believe that 
the subject of a child custody proceeding is an Indian child 
according to the definitions of the Act, that court must notify 
the child's tribe.48 The ICWA extends certain rights to the 
The term Indian . . . shall include all persons of Indian descent who are 
members of any Indian tribe recognized now under Federal jurisdiction, 
and all persons who are descendants of such members who were on June 
1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, 
and shall further include all other persons of one·half or more Indian 
blood .... Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be con-
sidered Indians. 
25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988). 
45 In re Petition to Adopt T.I.S., 586 N.E.2d 690, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
The Appellate Court of Illinois considered the definition of "Indian tribe" for the 
purposes of the ICWA, and ruled that the ICWA is not applicable to Indians who 
are members of Canadian tribes not recognized by the United States government, 
and that exclusion from the provisions of the ICWA did not violate equal protec-
tion rights. 
46 "Indian" child is defined as follows: 
Indian child means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and 
is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership 
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian 
tribe; 
"Indian child's tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which the Indian 
child is a member or (b) in the case of an Indian child who is a member 
of or eligible for membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe 
with which the Indian child has the more significant contacts; 
"Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal custody of 
an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to 
whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred 
by the parent of such child; 
25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988). 
47 !d. 
48 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) states, in part: 
In any involuntary proceeding in a State court where the court knows 
or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking 
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian 
child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's 
tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending 
proceedings and of their right of intervention .... No foster care place-
ment or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at 
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tribe, and recognizes a tribal interest similar to the interests 
reserved for family members in non-Indian custody proceed-
ings. The tribe and the child's Indian caretaker may exercise 
any of several options, including the right of intervention in the 
proceeding. 49 
2. The right of intervention 
The right of intervention by the tribe or the child's Indian 
custodian in any custody action for placement of an Indian 
child appears to be unlimited and may be exercised at any 
time.50 Besides allowing broad intervention rights, the ICWA 
grants tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody 
proceedings involving an Indian child. Tribes without tribal 
courts, including most native Alaskan communities, protect 
their interests solely through intervention in state proceedings. 
The right to receive notice and to intervene is not subject 
to discretion51 by state courts, and may be exercised against 
the wishes of Indian parents.52 Courts have held that tribes 
I d. 
least ten days after receipt of notice .... [The] parent or Indian cus-
todian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to twenty addition-
al days to prepare for such a proceeding. 
49 "The Act . . . provides that Indian tribes are to play a central role in 
custody proceedings involving Indian children . . . . If tribes are to protect the 
values Congress recognized, they must be allowed to participate in hearings in 
which those values are significantly implicated." In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 
154, 156 (Wash. 1986). An Indian custodian may intervene in any child custody ac-
tion involving an Indian child. For a discussion of the relationship between an 
Indian custodian and the tribe, see In re Charloe, 629 P.2d 1319 (Or. 1981). The 
right of intervention is established by 25 U.S.C. § 191l(a) (1988). 
50 25 U.S.C. § l91l(c) (1988). 
51 In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1986). 
52 A case from Montana graphically illustrates this problem from the paren-
tal viewpoint. In spite of vehement protests by a member of the White Mountain 
Apache tribe, her parental rights were terminated by the tribe and her child de-
clared a ward of the tribal court. Though concluding that the state court had no 
choice but to transfer the case to tribal court, Justice Weber stated the following 
in a dissenting opinion: 
First, I am shocked at the Tribe's apparent disregard of the due process 
rights of the parent .... Also shocking to me is the apparent ease with 
which the Tribe now argues against the desires of the mother, one of its 
own tribal members .... Who is left to represent the rights of the indi-
vidual Indian mother when she is so abandoned by her tribe? 
In re Parental Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Mont. 1989). 
Referring to Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), 
Justice Weber continued: 
This holding indicates the interests of the tribe now are superior to the in-
162 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
have an "absolute" right of notice and intervention in a hearing 
concerning the voluntary or involuntary surrender of parental 
rights by the parent of an Indian child.53 In another Alaska 
case, Alaskan Supreme Court Justice Rabinowitz, in a strongly 
worded dissenting opinion, discussed the interests of the par-
ents and the tribe in the Indian child: 
[The] tribe has a right to intervene at any point in any 
State proceeding regardless of the parent's consent. This right 
to intervene is absolute, as an instrumental part of the juris-
dictional scheme "at the heart of the ICW A." Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians u. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). To 
deny tribes this right in voluntary proceedings is to allow 
parents to defeat the Congressional scheme by usurping the 
tribe's equal interest in the Indian child. Id. at 1610, 4415. 
("[T]he tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct 
from but on a parity with the interest of the parents.") (citing 
In re Adoption of Halloway, 48 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 732 P.2d 
962, 969-70 (Utah 1986).54 
The notion of "parity" between tribal and parental interests 
is startling to many non-Indian social workers and courts55 
and may lead to friction between the tribe and the state.56 The 
role the tribe plays in Indian life has no counterpart in contem-
porary non-Indian American society. Consequently, state wel-
fare workers may be confused and even hostile when confront-
ed with what appears to be unwarranted intrusion by a tribe 
asserting the "equal interest" of parents and tribes in Indian 
children. 57 The incidence of such confrontation is minimized 
by the jurisdictional grant to tribal courts. 
I d. 
terests of the parents .... [I]t was questionable whether Congress intend-
ed to deprive Indian parents of their wishes in regard to the placement of 
their children. Parental rights are among the most significant rights grant-
ed to any human being. 
53 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); In re 
Adoption of Halloway, n2 P.2d 963 (Utah 1986). 
54 Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. Cook Inlet Tribal Council, 783 P.2d 1159, 
1162 (Alaska 1989). 
55 Id.; see also In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 96::! (Utah). 
56 For a discussion of what constitutes parental abandonment, see In re 
J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1990). 
57 See, e.g., Catholic Social Serv., Inc. v. Cook Inlet Tribal Council, 783 P.2d 
1159 (Alaska 1989). 
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3. Jurisdiction of tribal courts in child custody proceedings 
Indian leaders, concerned over perceived insensitivity by 
state courts and welfare agencies to the unique needs of Indian 
children, supported a statutory grant of exclusive tribal court 
jurisdiction in adoptions and foster care placements. 58 Unless 
preempted by federal law, the tribal court has exclusive juris-
diction in any child custody proceeding involving an Indian 
child domiciled on the reservation. If federal law preempts 
tribal jurisdiction, the state has jurisdiction, but is still subject 
to the notice and intervention requirements of the ICW A. 59 
Proceedings involving Indian children not domiciled on a 
reservation are always subject to the tribe's right to assert its 
interest. Absent good cause to the contrary,60 state courts 
must, on petition of the child's parent, Indian custodian, or 
tribe,61 transfer to the tribal court any custody proceeding 
involving an Indian child who is not residing on, or domiciled 
on, the reservation, subject to two limitations: ( 1) the objection 
of either parent to transferring the proceeding, and (2) the 
right of the tribal court to decline the transfer. 62 The Act does 
not define "good cause" in this context, however, and state 
courts have some discretion in determining what constitutes 
good cause for not transferring a proceeding. B:l 
Also of concern to child welfare authorities and to adoptive 
parents, is the provision that gives the tribal court jurisdiction 
except "where such jurisdiction is vested in the State64 by ex-
fi8 Lynn A. Kerbeshian, Domicile: FedPral Definition of Domicile Determines 
Junsdiction Under Indian Child Welfarr' Act, 66 N.D. L. REV. fi5:3 (1990). 
fi9 2fi U.S.C. §§ 191l(a), 191l(c), 1912(a) (1988). 
60 In addition, published guidelines from the Bureau of Indian Affairs list 
the following as "good cause" to prevent transfer of an action to a tribal court: 
objection to transfer by a child over the age of 12 or parents of a child over the 
age of five, or little contact of the child with his tribe. Guidelines for State Courts: 
Indian Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67, 584, fi91 (1979). 
61 See. e.f?., In re Adoption of T.R.M., 489 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. 1986). 
62 25 U.S.C. § 191l(b) (1988). 
6:1 SPP, e.g, In rP Appeal of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 
828 P.2d 124fi (Ariz. 1991); Native Village of Venetie v. Alaska, 918 F.2d 797 (9th 
Cir. 1990); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Brown v. Rice, 760 F. Supp. 1459 (Kan. 1991). 
64 State court jurisdiction exists in some cases through Public Law 280, 
which granted civil jurisdiction to states over civil actions "between Indians to 
which Indians arc parties" in certain specific geographic areas: all of Alaska, Ne-
braska, or California, and most of Minnesota. Oregon, and Wisconsin, with the 
exception of certain named reservations. 28 U.S.C. § 1:160(a) (1988). 
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isting Federallaw."65 Domicile plays an important role in such 
determinations. The tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction for 
children of parents domiciled on the reservation. For children 
domiciled off the reservation, tribal court jurisdiction may be 
concurrent with state court jurisdiction, creating complexities 
not adequately addressed by the ICWA. The issue of domicile 
may become a serious contention to the detriment of the child. 
Its determination is always subject to a charge of error.66 
4. Placement preferences of the ICWA 
The ICWA purports to accomplish its goals by imposing a 
hierarchy of placement preferences upon the courts. These 
preferred placements reflect Indian cultural values and the 
important roles the tribe and extended family play in Indian 
societies. In order of priority, adoptive placement preferences 
under the ICWA are: (1) a member of the child's extended fami-
ly; (2) other members of the child's tribe; or (3) other Indian 
families. 67 
The statute applies only to state court proceedings. Tribal 
courts are not subject to provisions of the ICW A, presumably 
because they are expected to act in harmony with Indian priori-
ties. As a result, tribes may substitute their own list of prefer-
ences for those imposed on state courts.68 In protecting tribal 
interests, tribal courts frequently disregard the explicit wishes 
of parents and family members, and award custody to tribal 
members and extended family even though parents have ex-
pressed preferences for off-reservation or non-Indian adoptive 
placement.69 State courts are expected to apply Indian cultur-
al or community standards in the implementation of the prefer-
ence directives. 70 The placement preferences of the Act may be 
65 25 U.S.C. § 191l(a), 191l(c) (1988). 
66 As Justice Steven's dissent in Holyfield points out, "any adoption of an 
Indian child effected through a state court will be susceptible of challenge no mat-
ter how old the child and how long it has lived with its adoptive parents." Miss. 
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. ao (1989); see also In re Adoption 
of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986). 
67 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988). 
68 !d. 
69 The tribe may establish a different order of preference, and may, "where 
appropriate," consider the preferences of the Indian child or parent. 25 U.S.C. § 
1915(c) (1988). See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 
(1989); In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986); In re Parental 
Placement of M.R.D.B., 787 P.2d 1219 (Mont. 1990); In rP Adoption of Bahy Boy 
1., 64;{ P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). 
70 "The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of 
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set aside by state courts for "good cause" though the statute 
fails to define this term. 71 Despite occasional jurisdictional 
disputes between tribes, parents, and extended families, tribal 
jurisdiction over child custody has proven to be a powerful tool 
in the hands of Indian tribes, since state courts are required to 
accord "full faith and credit" to tribal adoption and placement 
orders.n 
C. Constitutional Concerns Raised by the ICWA 
The passage of the ICWA in 1978, and its subsequent im-
plementation in the various tribal and state courts have raised 
several Constitutional questions. Not all of these questions 
have been resolved to the satisfaction of parties directly in-
volved in Indian affairs. Despite these difficulties, few detrac-
tors have been willing to speak against the stated purposes of 
the Act since the general end the Act aims to achieve is widely 
believed to be laudable. 7:J The means used to achieve that end, 
however, have been criticized. 
The ICWA may be seen as a jurisdictional encroachment 
on the traditional right of states to regulate family law within 
their borders. During the hearings prior to passage of the 
ICWA, a statement from the Department of Justice placed this 
issue in clear focus: 
[W]e are not convinced that Congress' power to control the 
incidents of such litigation involving nonreservation Indian 
children and parents pursuant to the Indian commerce clause 
is sufficient to override the significant State interest in regu-
lating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising 
State jurisdiction over what is traditionally a state matter. 74 
The obvious and undeniable racial basis of the Act may 
this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian 
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the par-




7:-! Because of this reference to protecting Indian families, there has been 
some discussion as to whether the ICWA was intended to apply only where there 
was an intact Indian family. Such an interpretation would preclude application to 
children of unwed or divorced parents. This does not appear to be the interpreta-
tion of most courts. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1993). See supra 
note ::l8 and accompanying text. 
74 H.R. REP. No. 95-1::186, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1978). 
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also violate the Fifth Amendment. It can be argued that the 
ICW A is regulation and jurisdiction based on race alone. The 
Department of Justice expressed concern about denying access 
to state courts to Indians who have chosen not to participate in 
tribal activities. It is questionable whether Congress intended 
such a person to be forced, based only on his race, to submit to 
tribal court rulings regarding such important matters as child 
custody, when a similarly situated non-Indian would have 
access to the full range of lower and appellate courts of his 
state: 
An eligible Indian who has chosen, for whatever reasons, not 
to enroll in a tribe would be in a position to argue that de-
priving him of access to the state courts on matters related to 
family life would be invidious. Such an Indian presumably 
has, under the First Amendment, the same right of associa-
tion as do all citizens, and indeed would appear to be in no 
different situation from a non-Indian living on the reservation 
who . . . would have access to State courts. The only differ-
ence between them, in fact, would be the racial characteristics 
of the former. 75 
While Congress did discuss and debate these issues prior 
to passage of the ICWA, the conflicts were not resolved to 
everyone's satisfaction. 76 Whether constitutional compromises 
were made, and if so whether they were justified by the good 
that was expected to be accomplished remains a question over 
which reasonable people may disagree. These issues remain in 
the background in most custody proceedings involving the 
ICWA, though they never disappear. Indian and non-Indian 
parents and guardians disagree about the racial impact of the 
Act on individual rights, especially when the ICW A is used to 
accomplish goals far removed from its stated purposes. The 
ICWA has been invoked in custody proceedings involving an 
Indian child, defined for the purposes of the Act, with as little 
as 1/64th Indian ancestry, whose parents had no ties whatsoev-
er to Indian culture. 77 The ICW A was merely used as a tool to 
invalidate a state court action. In such a case, the Act cannot 
75 H.R. REP. No. 9fi-UlH6, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. :l7 (1971\). 
76 See, for example, In re Guardianship of D.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 
1980), where a South Dakota court dismssed state and federal constitutional con-
cerns raised hy the ICWA and concluded that there was no substantial constitu-
tional conflict. 
77 In rP Adoption of T.N.F., 7Sl P.2d 97:1 (Alaska l9H9). 
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fulfill its stated purpose-to protect Indian families. 78 In the 
case of F.H., there was no intact Indian family to be protected. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ICWA TO THE ADOPTION OF F.H. 
A. The Issue in the Lower Court 
The Superior Court of Alaska was asked to decide whether 
good cause existed to disregard the placement preferences of 
the ICWA, and allow a non-Indian adoptive placement of F.H., 
an Indian child. It held that there was good cause to deviate 
from the mandated placement preferences. The Village of 
Noatak appealed, exercising its right of intervention under 
Section 1911(c) ofthe ICWA. 
B. The Issue on Appeal 
On appeal by the village, the issue as stated by the Su-
preme Court of Alaska, was "whether the superior court erred 
in concluding that good cause existed to deviate from the adop-
tive placement preferences mandated under ICWA."79 The rul-
ing of the lower court could be overturned only if there was 
abuse of discretion, or if "controlling factual findings are clearly 
erroneous."80 The adoptive parents had to show by a prepon-
derance of evidence that good cause existed to permit a place-
ment not in accord with the ICWA placement preferences. In 
addition to the ICWA, state adoption regulations address the 
issue of discretion.81 
C. The Village of Noatak's Argument 
For the village, opposition to the placement was based on 
the principle that a non-Indian placement would deny the child 
access to her native culture. ICW A guidelines gave first priority 
preference to Mary Penn, who satisfies two criteria, as the 
child's aunt, and a member of the native village. 
Furthermore, the village maintained that all three ICWA 
78 See also In re Adoption of Quinn, 845 P.2d 206 (Or. 1993). An unmarried 
teenage mother, one-eighth Cherokee, with no ties to Indian culture or tribal mem-
bers, enrolled in the Cherokee tribe one week prior to the state custody hearing, 
with no purpose other than to defeat state court jurisdiction and revoke her con-
sent to adoption of her baby, who was 1/16th Cherokee. 
79 Adoptwn of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1363. 
80 !d. 
81 Alaska Adoption Rule 11(0 (1991) provides that "good cause" is a matter 
of discretion for the state court. !d. at 1363. 
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placement preferences82 must be considered before an outside 
placement could occur. This argument, which would require 
exhaustion of all other possibilities in preference to a non-Indi-
an placement, would virtually guarantee denial of the Hartley 
adoption. 
The village relied upon the decision in Holyfield,83 argu-
ing that parental preference was not controlling and could not 
be used to determine an adoptive placement in opposition to 
the interests of the child's tribe. The village also argued that 
even if the court found that the preference of the biological 
mother could be used to establish good cause, it should be dis-
regarded in the instant case, contending that E.P.D.'s decision 
to relinquish her parental rights was not reasonable or knowl-
edgeable. 84 
The village submitted affidavits stating that E.P.D. and 
other family members would have access to F.H. in Noatak if 
the Mary Penn placement was approved.85 Absent was any 
reference to the best interest of F.H. An unspoken assumption 
seems to have been that the child's interests are subsumed in 
the tribal interest.86 
D. The State's Argument 
The lower court placed considerable emphasis on maternal 
preference and the fact that E.P.D. had signed away her paren-
tal rights at a hearing where the "terms and consequences" of 
her decision were openly discussed. 87 The court specifically 
followed the recommendation of Probate Master John E. 
Duggan, acknowledging the "strong and consistent preference" 
of the birth mother for the Hartley placement, and against 
82 The order of preferences are: (1) a member of the child's immediate fami-
ly, (2) a member of the child's tribe, and (3) any other Indian family. 2fi U.S.C. § 
1915(a) (1988). 
83 Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
84 This conclusion is supported by the following: 
E.P.D. had offered to relinquish F.H. to several people, including Mary 
Penn. At least once, she adamantly opposed placement with the Hartleys. 
She admitted that when she signed the relinquishment to the Hartleys 
she was so mixed up she would have signed anything. Noatak argues 
that E.P.D.'s decision was based in part on her belief that F.H. had seri-
ous health problems. 
Adoption of F.H., 8fi1 P.2d at 1364. 
85 ld. at 1368-65. 
86 ld. 
87 ld. 
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placement of her daughter in the village of Noatak.88 
Additionally, the court looked to other factors, including 
the bond between F.H. and Nancy Hartley, and the open adop-
tion agreement that permitted visitation rights by E.P.D. and 
informational access to all parties to the adoption.89 The court 
gave some weight to E.P.D.'s statement that she could more 
easily visit F.H. in Kennewick than in Noatak.90 There is no 
reference to visitation by other family or tribal members, and 
the court seems not to have considered this a priority.91 
The lower court found three factors determinative in this 
case: ( 1) matemal preference, (2) the bond between the child 
and the adoptive parents, and (3) the openness of this adop-
tion.92 These factors, taken together, constituted good cause to 
deviate from the preferred placement of the ICWA.93 This rea-
soning indicates that the court gave considerable weight to the 
individual preferences and needs of the biological mother and 
child, rather than merely focusing on tribal interests.94 
E. Holding of the Supreme Court of Alaska 
The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the trial court deci-
sion, finding a good cause exception to ICWA placement prefer-
ences.95 In so doing, the Court reasoned that the best interest 
of the child was to continue her placement with the 
Hartleys.96 The court rejected arguments that the ICWA pref-
erences must be exhausted before any other placement could be 
considered.97 This interpretation gives new breadth to the con-
cept of "best interests" in the context of the ICWA.98 Another 
observer has noted the irony of weighing the welfare of chil-
88 [d. 
89 I d. 
90 I d. 
91 I d. 
92 ld. at 1363. 
93 ld. at 1365. 
94 See generally Dale, supra note 1; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 
1986). 
95 Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d at 1365. 
96 State welfare officials were unanimous in their recommendation that F.H. 
remain with the Hartleys. F.H.'s case worker from the Alaska DFYS, who moni· 
tored the family until the Hartleys moved to Washington in 1991, stated that she 
helieved F.H. should have remained with the Hartleys. Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 
at 1364. 
97 ld. at 1364 n.3. 
98 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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dren like F.H. against the interests of their tribes: 
It is somewhat paradoxical that the ICWA which was enacted 
to further the best interests of Indian children forbids consid-
ering the best interest of the individual child. The ICWA 
presumes that the child's best interest results from protecting 
the relationship between the child and the tribe. A traditional 
"best interest of the child" standard was rejected by Congress 
because it was susceptible to bias by state agencies and 
courts. However, the rejection of the best interest standard 
may work to the disadvantage of the child because interest in 
tribal integrity and self-government is given precedence over 
the child's interests. 99 
This decision by the Supreme Court of Alaska attempts to 
address the controversy, balancing the needs and well-being of 
F.H., a vulnerable three year old, against her native village's 
interest in preserving its connection to its children. The open 
nature of this adoption gives F.H. access to her extended family 
and her native roots. The loving and supportive environment of 
her adoptive family will provide the child with emotional sup-
port, medical care, and other needs. Perhaps just as important, 
however, is the fact F.H. has been spared the tragedy of sepa-
ration from the woman she loves as her mother, a bonding de-
scribed by F.H.'s social worker, as "the best she will ever 
have.''100 This court determined that the good cause provision 
may allow an alternative placement preference which need not 
be the option of last resort. 101 In this humane and reasoned 
decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska weighed competing 
interests to find that the child's best interests constituted good 
cause to deviate from ICWA preferred placement guide-
lines.102 
99 Kerbeshian, supra note 58, at 556. 
100 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. These guidelines define "good 
cause" to prevent transfer of an action to a tribal court, though not for deviation 
from the placement preferences. How much discretion in placement is allowed state 
courts is an issue before the court in the instant case. For a discussion of the best 
interests of the child in relation to the best interest of the tribe, see In re Adop-
tion of Doe, 555 P.2d 906 (N.M. 1976). 
102 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The village had argued that 
the court was required to exhaust all other options under the ICWA before it could 
approve a non-preferred placement. This court rejected that argument. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed to prevent the 
destruction of Indian families. In implementing the statute, 
however, state courts have been brought face-to-face with un-
avoidable conflicts between Indian family norms and those of 
non-Indians. Non-Indian social welfare agencies have tradition-
ally emphasized the welfare of the individual child and the 
preference of the biological parents, a position that Indians 
have considered far too narrow. The pervasive role of the tribe 
in Indian life has no counterpart in other contemporary cul-
tures in this country, and it has been difficult for tribes to 
communicate their values to the predominantly non-Indian 
judicial system. Tribes have equated their own interests with 
the best interests of the child, a view difficult for state courts to 
adopt wholeheartedly; nevertheless, states have been forced by 
the ICW A to develop tolerance of tribal interests. In the end, 
tribes will win only when each Indian child who goes into fos-
ter care or adoptive placement has the opportunity to grow in a 
nurturing environment, enriched by access to his or her native 
culture. 
Ivy N. Voss 
